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RESTORING THE BALANCING TEST: A BETTER APPROACH
TO FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT
CHARLIE PENROD, J.D.1

ABSTRACT
Fair use analyses are overly vague and abstract. While the Copyright
Act established four factors for courts to consider when determining if an
alleged infringer’s use of copyrighted work is “fair”, these factors are not
susceptible to easy interpretation. More importantly, once these factors
have been interpreted, a trier of fact is instructed to balance these factors
against each other. No effective method currently exists in guiding courts
as to how to balance inherently disparate factors against each other, either
in terms of intensity of the factors or how one factor might balance against
another totally different factor. This article proposes a framework that
would allow courts to interpret each of the four factors and then assign a
grade of 1-4 for each factor. After each factor is graded, the values are inserted into the framework, which then performs the balancing and reaches a
conclusion on fair use. Having an objective basis for reaching a fair use
determination helps to eliminate result-oriented decisions and provides a
firm ground of support for a court’s decision.

1. Assistant Professor, University of West Florida. I would like to thank Mathew Morrison for
his enormously valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this Article.
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RESTORING THE BALANCING TEST: A BETTER APPROACH
TO FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT
CHARLIE PENROD, J.D.
INTRODUCTION
Little Johnny and Jimmy are brothers. Johnny is five years old and
Jimmy is three. Johnny and Jimmy are playing with their trucks on the
living room floor. Jimmy decides that he no longer likes the truck he has
and reaches over to take Johnny’s truck. Johnny quickly puts it out of reach
and tells Jimmy, “It’s mine – you can’t have it!” Jimmy looks to his mother
and begins to cry uncontrollably and says, “But Mom – I want it!” Mom
looks at Johnny and says, “Look Johnny – you are bigger and you can play
with something else. He is too small to understand that some things belong
to others. Just give him your truck and go find something else to do.” Johnny hesitantly gives the truck to Jimmy before pitifully saying, “This isn’t
fair!”
Maybe it is fair and maybe it is not. Who can tell? Mom has decided
what is fair subjectively without any real objective standard. Perhaps she
was simply tired of hearing little Jimmy cry. Perhaps she felt that Johnny
should not be bothered by losing the truck to Jimmy. Maybe she thinks that
Johnny simply should not have complete ownership over the truck, and he
should be willing to share with those who do not have what he has. Either
way, Johnny is left wondering why life and Mom have treated him unfairly,
while Jimmy gets to gleefully play with something that is not rightfully his.
The same dilemma strikes judges and juries when deciding whether or
not a second person can appropriate someone else’s copyrighted property
as their own. Just like Mom really had no bright line basis to determine
what was “fair”, neither do triers of fact.2 And, that is a problem. The law
allows others to take copyrighted original works only if the use is a “fair”
one.3 Sometimes, society is better off by allowing others to use copyrighted
works as their own, just as Mom believed her family’s life would be better
off by allowing Jimmy to have the truck. But, without some justification
for why some uses are fair and some are not, litigants could be left with the
sense that the decision was simply an arbitrary decision against them. Copyright law, and Mom’s decision making, would be much better off if some

2. A determination of fair use uses a statutory balancing test rather than a bright line rule. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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framework existed to more objectively determine what is and what is not
fair.
This Article seeks to provide triers of fact with a new framework to
analyze fair use in an attempt to reach more consistent and sound decisions.
Part I explores the state of the law as it pertains to fair use. Part II highlights the fundamental deficiencies with the current fair use analysis and
introduces a new, but complementary, framework and a discussion of how
triers of fact are to best use it to reach logical resolutions. Part III implements the framework in the context of previously decided cases to view
how the framework either supports the Court’s decision or contradicts it.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the results. Once again, the goal of this
framework is not to recreate fair use jurisprudence, but instead to provide a
viable mechanism to explain a court’s reasoning.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Basics
The U.S. Constitution grants the Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Rights and Discoveries.4“ Otherwise known as the Copyright Clause, this provision within
Article I lays out a grant of federal power to regulate certain intellectual
property rights to create a system to adequately promote science.5 Rather
than having to rely on its regulatory powers through the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Copyright Clause gives Congress a direct means by
which to provide authors protection from unfair uses of their creative
works.6
Of course, there are limitations. The Copyright Clause itself restricts
copyright protection for “limited times”, which, as of works currently created, lasts for 70 years after the author’s death for individuals, if the author
is an individual.7 Copyright protection lasts anywhere from 95-120 years
for works created by a corporate entity.8 Further, the Copyright Act only
confers protections to authors whose works are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression.9 A crucial corollary to this proposition is that ideas are not
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
5. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (stating that a key aspect of the Copyright
Clause involves “rewarding authors for their creative labor”).
6. Id. at 212 (holding that Congress, and not the courts, is tasked with how best to implement the
Copyright Clause’s objectives).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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copyrightable and can be appropriated without running afoul of copyright
laws.10
Take for example the successful animated film Cars. Cars was released in 2006 and features an animated, talking red race car named Lightning McQueen.11 The film centers on Lightning McQueen’s quest to win
the Piston Cup in the face of heavy competition from his peers.12 Similarly,
Roary, the Racing Car is a television show that began in 2007.13 It features
Roary, who is also an animated, talking red racecar.14 Roary teaches lessons to small children through various adventures as he races on the Silver
Hatch Racing Circuit.15 The cars themselves are similar, but not identical,
and the voices used and adventures of the cars are different.16 At first blush,
it might appear to the untrained eye that Roary has committed some sort of
copyright infringement against Cars. However, what was taken, if anything, was the idea of using a red talking animated racecar as the centerpiece of a children’s entertainment show. Nothing fixed in a medium was
copied – only the idea for such a show was appropriated. Under the Copyright Act, this is legally permissible and Cars has no legal remedy to enjoin
Roary from the use of this idea. This stems partly from the fact that the law
seeks only to protect the specific form of the work produced and not the
idea behind the work.17 Otherwise, giving monopoly power to an idea
would stifle innovation, limit creative outlets, and reduce the panoply of
creative works available for consumers.
Originality is the fountainhead for copyright protection.18 In order to
be eligible for copyright protection, the work must actually be created by
the author and possess some minimum level of creativity.19 The Copyright
Act itself provides an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of original works of
authorship that have copyright protection.20 As one would expect, literary
works, movies, sound recordings, and paintings are considered original
works of authorship.21 Other works, such as dance, pantomime, architectural works, and photographs also are protected.22 On the other hand, facts are
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); See also Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 at 219 (2003).
CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006).
Id.
See generally ROARY, THE RACING CAR (PBS Sprout 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
Id. at 345.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Id.
Id.
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not copyrightable, except that a unique compilation of facts does retain
some copyright protection.23 For example, the statement “the sun is 93
million miles from Earth” is a non-copyrightable fact, but a compilation of
terms describing animal groups, arranged based on their “lyrical and poetic
potential,” does have some copyright protection.24
Prior to 1989, works that had not been formally registered received no
copyright protection and infringers were immune from suits for infringement occurring prior to registration.25 Now, copyright registration is no
longer necessary to protect substantive rights, but it is a procedural prerequisite that must be completed before a lawsuit is filed26 In other words,
copyright registration is “required for litigation but not for the existence of
copyright.”27
In any copyright infringement case, there is what amounts to a threestep analysis that must be performed to resolve any dispute. First, copyright
holders can, and often do, license or grant consent to third parties for the
limited use of their works. The scope of the ability to use copyrighted
works is dependent upon the licensing agreement.28 This is an issue of contractual interpretation as to what the intent of the parties is. If the use by the
third party is included in the terms of the licensing agreement, the author
has contractually consented to waive his/her copyright and the author no
longer has a substantive right to sue under copyright law.29 Additionally,
copyright holders can make their works “open source,” by explicitly waiving some or all copyrights in their otherwise protected work.30 Thus, any
use of these works by third parties does not constitute copyright infringement despite any actual copying, so long as the user complies with the
terms of the open source license.31 Websites such as Creative Commons are
23. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (1991).
24. Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 467 (2nd Cir. 1995).
25. The U.S. became a signatory to the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which
among other things changed copyright law to make registration permissive rather than mandatory. The
Act became effective on March 1, 1989. See Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1989). For further
discussion, see Society of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 44 (1st Cir.
2012).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
27. Neri v. Monroe, 726 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013).
28. See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998).
29. Id.
30. See Open Source Definition, OPENSOURCE, http://www.opensource.org/osd.html (last visited
September 1, 2014).
31. This is prevalent in the software industry, where open source licenses essentially grant a
royalty-free license to users that allows users to modify and/or use the software so long as certain
conditions are followed. Debra Brubaker Burns, Titans and Trolls Enter the Open-Source Arena, 5
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 33, 33–34 (2013). Some of these conditions might include a requirement to
provide copyright notices and/or to make the source code readily obtainable to other users. Maxim V.
Tsotsorin, Open Source Software Compliance: The Devil is Not So Black as He is Painted, 29 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 559, 559–60 (2013).
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devoted to developing tailor-made copyright licenses that allow authors to
make their works completely open source or open source with restrictions.32 Internet sites such as Flickr, for example, give users the ability
to declare their works to be open source for the public’s use.33
In the absence of a licensing agreement, courts must then consider the
next question: has the infringer appropriated anything copyrightable into
his/her work?34 In other words, has the infringer copied, distributed, or
publicly displayed any part of a fixed, original work created by the author?35 In most cases, this is easy to determine. It is beyond debate that
Vanilla Ice’s song “Ice Ice Baby”, for example, uses the opening beat from
Queen’s “Under Pressure.”36 The two songs sound almost identical at their
inceptions and only upon very close attention can someone distinguish the
two.37 Since musical beats and arrangements are original, creative, and
fixed in a medium, Queen should have the right to prevent Vanilla Ice from
appropriating any part of its work.
More recently, the well-known A&M Records copyright infringement
case involved massive amounts of direct copying of millions of songs on
the Napster peer-to-peer network.38 Songs retain copyright protection even
in electronic form, and there was simply no doubt that direct copying in
violation of the original author’s copyrights was rampant.39 As a result, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Napster to be legally responsible for the copyright infringement occurring through its website.40
On the other hand, songs that sound vaguely familiar to, but not identical to, an original work are more difficult questions more appropriately
resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment. For example, the
band Loomis and the Lust has filed suit against the pop star Jessie J for her

32. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited September 1, 2014).
33. See FLICKR.COM, http://www.flickr.com (last visited September 1, 2014).
34. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
36. To listen to those songs, see YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rog8ou-ZepE (last
visited
September
1,
2014)
(“Ice
Ice
Baby”);
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnTFNsmToHg (last visited September 1, 2014) (“Under Pressure”).
37. In an early 1990s interview to MTV, Vanilla Ice defended his infringement on the ground that
there is a slight bridge between the two main baselines, whereas Under Pressure is simply a replaying of
the hook over and over. While technically true, this does not take away from the fact that the rest of the
sound is identical. To view the interview, see Vanilla Ice MTV Interview, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2012),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bid0AbLTcco (last visited September 1, 2014).
38. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 1017.
40. Id.
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song “Domino.”41 Loomis and the Lust’s song, “Bright Red Chords,” does
sound vaguely familiar to the opening of “Domino,” but the level of similarity is nowhere near the identical baselines in “Ice Ice Baby.” The threshold question to be resolved is: has Jessie J actually copied protected work,
or has she simply used a series of baseline chords (or facts) available to
make a new work independent of the original? Those trained in the musical
arts are far more equipped to make this determination than laypersons or
attorneys, and whether or not infringement actually occurred lies in the
province of expert witnesses.42
B. Defining Fair Use
Assuming a court finds that copyrightable material was used by an infringer, the usual next step is to determine whether or not the use is a “fair
use.”43 Fair use is a statutorily codified defense to infringement.44 Essentially, Congress has determined that not all uses of copyrighted works
should be impermissible. Using a smaller amount of the work to create a
new one, for example, might be a fair use that society can and should tolerate.45 Or, if the infringer’s use of the original is transformed into a new
work independent from the original without bad faith intent to blindly profit from the author’s work, the law is more inclined to allow such appropriations to happen.46 In other words, copyrighted works should not be totally
impervious to infringement when the benefits to society outweigh the un-

41. See Josh Grossberg, Jessie J Slapped with Copyright Infringement Suit Over “Domino”,
E!ONLINE (June 28, 2012), http://www.eonline.com/news/326779/jessie-j-slapped-with-copyrightinfringement-suit-over-domino (last visited September 1, 2014).
42. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473–74 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that expert witnesses may
determine similarities and infringement, but not necessarily illicit copying or appropriating).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
44. Some commentators also contend that there is an ethical component to fair use as well. See,
e.g., Rebecca Pressman, Fair Use: Law, Ethics and Librarians, 47 JOURNAL OF LIBRARY
ADMINISTRATION 89, 89 (2008), Pressman argues that fair use is more than just a legal construct that
constrains the behavior of infringers and that fair use also has an ethical component which might give
rise to additional rights and obligations over and above the restrictions of Section 107 of the Copyright
Act. See also Michael Murray, DIOS MIO – The KISS Principle of the Ethical Approach to Copyright
and Right of Publicity Law, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 89–92 (2013). Michael Murray argues that
the ethical responsibilities of authors to refrain from using others copyrighted works gives rise to an
extra-legal obligation he terms “DIOS MIO” (Don’t Include Other’s Stuff or Modify It Obviously).
45. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2569 (2009).
Samuelson notes that society as a whole benefits when subsequent authors are allowed to make fair uses
of copyrighted work.) See also Steve P. Calandrillo and Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 403–04 (2008).
Calandrillo and Davison argue that in light of the fact that fair use balances the need of society to obtain
creative works with the author’s right to earn revenue, an important goal of copyright law in general
should be to ensure original works are delivered to a mass audience.
46. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599–600 (1994) (finding that song
parody’s commercial nature did not creation presumption of unfair use).
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fairness to the original author.47 Another explanation propounded by
Pressman is that the fair use defense saves time and money by eliminating
unnecessary individual negotiations for insignificant uses that are too minor
to require a full-fledged licensing agreement.48 Indeed, Congress has recognized that some specific and relatively insubstantial public displays of
copyrighted work are, by definition, not infringing, thus eliminating the
need for licensing agreements for such uses.49
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides for a balancing test of four
factors to be examined for fair use.50 No one factor is determinative, but
instead courts are expected to engage in a balancing test where the totality
of all four factors is weighed equally.51 The House of Representatives specifically envisioned a rule of reason, case-by-case analysis for all fair use
and rejected strict definitions.52 Presumably, this was done because original
works are wildly different, and works should be considered in light of their
market context, creativity, and customary uses rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach.
While the statute lays out four enumerated factors to be considered,
courts have widely diverging methods by which these factors are interpreted and applied. No uniform test exists for fair use, or even more problematically, how best to weigh these together. Martine Courant Rife aptly dedescribes the fair use analysis as “a chimera, something mystical and even
dangerous if you stake your scholarly life on it.”53 Rife does note that while
there are some boundaries that can be relied on, none of those boundaries
are bright lines.54 Neil Weinstock Netanel describes the situation as “hope-

47. See David Faguendes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1804 (2013).
Faguendes argues that some instances of copyright infringement are efficient and enhance social welfare, particularly where gaining permission to use the work is “untenable” or where the social benefits
to the infringement outweigh the costs of that infringement. Fagundes’ new construct of efficient infringement is not simply a re-working of fair use; rather, his idea of efficient copyright infringement
seeks to go beyond fair use to create a new subset of works that are immune from copyright infringement.
48. Pressman, supra note 44, at 92.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012) (e.g. Displays of movies in a face-to-face classroom – 17 U.S.C. §
110(1) (2012); Musical, non-profit performances – 17 U.S.C § 110(3) (2012); Public displays of radio
or television transmissions in small businesses and small restaurants – 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012)).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
51. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
52. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–50 n.31 (1984).
53. Martine Courant Rife, The Fair Use Doctrine: History, Application, and Implications for
(New Media) Writing Teachers, 24 COMPUTERS AND COMPOSITION 154, 164 (2007).
54. Id. at 164.

2015]

FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT

115

lessly unpredictable.”55 Similarly, David Nimmer describes the ability to
reach consistent fair use decisions as “a fairy tale.”56
Section 107 provides for the following four fair use factors:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit education
purposes;
2. The nature of the copyrighted work
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.57
Courts have struggled to devise uniform interpretations for each of
these factors. The Supreme Court has yet to give lower courts specific instructions as to how to balance these disparate factors against each other in
a manner that is consistent with the purpose of copyright laws.
C. The Supreme Court’s Fair Use Decisions
Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Supreme Court
has announced a triumvirate of decisions attempting to define the boundaries of the fair use defense. They are not always consistent with one another
and do not mesh together in a clear, systematic manner. Instead, the three
contrasting opinions only add to the incoherency of the fair use doctrine.
In Sony v. Universal, the Court held that video tape recorders (VTRs)
were not liable for contributory copyright infringement when private parties used these recorders to copy broadcast television programming.58 The
Court, for the first meaningful time, applied the fair use factors to determine whether or not these VTRs improperly infringed on the copyright
authors.59 The Court’s fair use analysis indicated that some factors might be
elevated in the levels of importance. First, the Court took special note of
the first factor – the purpose of the use.60 The Court, staying true to the
words of Section 107(1), discussed whether or not the use was of a commercial nature.61 However, the Court gave a legal presumption to the com-

55. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 716
(2011).
56. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
58. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 448–49.
61. Id.
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merciality of the use, stating that when a device is “used to make copies for
a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would be presumptively
be unfair.”62 The Court further found the contrary presumption would be
true as well – a finding of non-commerciality gives rise to a presumption of
fairness.63 The statute does not mandate or even suggest such a presumption; rather, the Court viewed the commerciality of the use as one that
transcends other factors.
This is particularly noteworthy when considering the short shrift the
Court gives to factors two and three. While conceding that both of these
factors militate in favor of an unfair use, the fact that VTR copying is at its
core a noncommercial activity when done in the home not only outweighed
but also rendered practically irrelevant the calculus of those two factors.64
No real “weighing” occurred between these factors – one was simply
deemed to be presumptively more important on the issue of fair use.
The Court then discussed the fourth factor – the effect on the copyrighted work. The Court made it clear that the fourth factor, unlike the second or the third, does matter and should be weighed against the first
factor.65 Specifically, the Court found that, for noncommercial uses, there
may be an unfair impairment of an author’s copyrights if the use affects the
potential market for the work or if the use affects future incentives to create
original works.66 In the end, the Court found no harmful effect in timeshifting, or simply watching a program at a different time that when it normally airs, and therefore the VTRs could successfully assert the fair use
defense.67
The second case, Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises,68 changed the
overall thrust of Sony. There, a magazine, The Nation, printed excerpts
from an unpublished memoir on Gerald Ford without the permission of the
copyright holder, Harper & Row.69 The Court first noted that the four fair
use factors are not exclusive; however, those in fact were the only four
considered.70 The Court backed away from the commercial/noncommercial

62. Id. at 449.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 449–50. As noted by the Court, television shows are likely to be of a creative nature.
Further, there is no doubt that the entire copyrighted work is being copied. The Court noted this but
ultimately disregarded that fact in the fair use analysis.
65. Id. at 450.
66. Id. at 450–51. The Court implied that the effect of the use is not important when the use is
commercial, stating that “noncommercial uses are a different matter.” Id. at 451. So, the effect of the
use would only be weighed when the purpose of the use was noncommercial.
67. Id. at 456.
68. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–42 (1985).
69. Id. at 542.
70. Id. at 560–61.
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presumption by instead holding that, “the fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use.”71 Even though news reporting could be considered noncommercial, the Court still found this factor weighted against a
finding of fair use because The Nation essentially stole these excerpts and
deprived Harper & Row of the benefits of being the first to publish the
memoirs.72 No elevation in importance was given to the purpose as it was
in Sony.
As for the nature, the Court found that although factual works have
less protection that works of fiction, there were some “expressive” elements in the memoirs that were more creative in nature.73 Further, the fact
that the work was unpublished was an important aspect of its nature that
weighed against a finding of fair use.74 As for amount, although a relatively
small amount of the entire memoir was taken and reprinted, the most important or core parts of the work were the ones actually copied. The Court
noted that because the important parts of the work were taken, the amount
factor tended to favor a finding of infringement.75
Lastly, the Court found a substantial effect on the market of the unpublished memoir since The Nation was able to get these excerpts to the
public first. Importantly, the Court here announced a clear departure from
the commercial presumption in Sony by holding, “[t]he last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”76 The Court held
that a finding of clear-cut, actual damages is not necessary; instead, an
author need only to show a reasonable probability exists that the infringement leads to adverse effect before the burden shifts to the defendant to
show the revenue loss would have occurred even without the infringement.77
The final of the three cases is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.78 In that case,
the group 2 Live Crew wrote a song titled “Pretty Woman”, which they
intended to be a parody version of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman”. The music and beat of both songs are very similar and there was little
71. Id. at 562. The language that commercialism “tends to weigh” against fair use, rather than
being presumptively against fair use, is certainly a departure from Sony. This implies that the purpose
factor is simply to be balanced against the others, since all of the factors generally tend to weigh one
way or the other, whereas a presumption implies that the other factors must be of sufficient weight to
overrule a finding of infringement.
72. Id. at 562–63.
73. Id. at 563–64.
74. Id. at 564.
75. Id. at 565–66.
76. Id. at 566.
77. Id.
78. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
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doubt that 2 Live Crew took copyrightable material from Acuff-Rose, the
copyright holder for “Oh, Pretty Woman.”79 Importantly, the Campbell
Court clearly departed from the holdings of Sony and Harper & Row that
either the commerciality or the effect on the market is given special consideration. Rather, the Court stated, “Nor may the four statutory factors be
treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”80
For the first time after 1976, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of the “transformative use” as a key component of the purpose of the
use. Those works that take the original and transform, add to, or otherwise
modify it for a “further purpose or different character” are more likely to be
fair uses.81 In departing from Sony, without expressly overruling it, the
Court held that the more transformative the work is, the less commercialism is significant.82 This is a far cry from Sony, where a finding of commercialism gave rise to a presumption of unfairness.83
The Court then applied the transformative use doctrine to 2 Live
Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman”. The Court had very little trouble
finding that a parody transforms an original into a new work of humor and
criticism. Continuing on, the Court found that even though this factor
weighed in favor of fair use, no presumptive weight should elevate this
factor over the others.84
Next, the Court noted that Orbison’s song is clearly creative and at the
core of what should be protected by copyright – however, the Court noted
that due to the unique nature of parody, this fact “is not much help in this
case.”85 Next, the Court found that the analysis used for the amount and
substantiality is different when judging parodies, given that parodies by
their very nature must appropriate material from the original to get the parody point across. For parodies, then, the analysis to be used is whether or
not “no more than necessary was taken,” rather than looking at how much
was taken in absolute terms.86 For the fourth factor, the effect on the value
of the original, the Court held that the record was incomplete in that no
evidence was submitted on the core issue of whether or not the rap version

79. Id. at 574.
80. Id. at 578.
81. Id. at 580.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 580. The Court did hold, however, that where no transformative purpose exists, the
“extent of its commerciality loom[s] larger.”
84. Id. at 583–84.
85. Id. at 586. However, this problem is remediated by the new framework proposed. A grade of
“4” could still be assigned to the nature without effecting the court’s final determination of fair use.
86. Id. at 589.
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would have any impact on the market for the original.87 Crucially, the
Court did not mention Harper & Row’s holding that the fourth factor is the
most important, and combining that with its holding that all factors are to
be explored, leads to the inevitable conclusion that Campbell declined to
follow Harper & Row on that point.
D. Interpretations of the Fair Use Factors
While the Supreme Court has given general guidance as to the meaning of the four factors, other courts and commentators have attempted to fill
in the missing gaps. As noted earlier, the two main components inherent
within the purpose of the use is whether the use is commercial and whether
the use is transformative. The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy is explicit
in the text of Section 107, but there is no statutory definition for a commercial use. Granted, certain illustrative noncommercial purposes such as news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, etc. appear in Section 107, but no overarching definition as to what is and what is not commercial exists in the
statute.88
First, monetary gain is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of
commerciality.89 Instead, what is crucial is “whether the user stands to
profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.”90 Eric Gorman notes that commerciality often turns on if
the infringing use was “primarily for public benefit, or for private commercial gain.”91 To the contrary, nonprofit uses are more likely to be deemed
fair.92
Matthew Sag devised categories of commercial and noncommercial
uses as those terms are understood by parties to litigation.93 He defined
commercial uses as those that used the original work as “part of a commercial product or service or as an intermediate step to creating a commercial
product or service”.94 On the other hand, Sag categorizes noncommercial
uses as uses that include are either personal, educational, research-based, or
for public communication.95 This categorization is helpful in that it allows

87. Id. at 593.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
89. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
90. Id. Presumably, the customary price involves some sort of licensing agreement.
91. Eric D. Gorman, Who Gets the Last Laugh? Satire, Doctrine of Fair Use, and Copywrong
Infringement, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 205, 208 (2010).
92. Matthew W. Wallace, Analyzing Fair Use Claims: A Quantitative and Paradigmatic Approach, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 121, 134 (1992).
93. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 56–61 (2012).
94. Id. at 61.
95. Id.
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courts to pigeonhole purposes into particular categories in the fair use analysis. One problem inherent with such categorization is that some uses have
multiple purposes, even if one predominates over the other.
Since Campbell, transformative uses are just as important, if not much
more important, than whether the use is commercial. As Campbell noted, a
work should have “new expression, meaning or message” to be considered
transformative.96 Sag notes that an exact definition of transformative uses is
difficult, giving examples including substantial copying, recontextualization, and even nonexpressive uses that were held to be transformative uses.97 So, both the motivation behind the work and the potential customer
base the transformative work serves are key ingredients to determine what
is transformative.
The nature of the copyrighted work revolves around the factual-fiction
distinction, with greater copyright protection for creative works such as
works of fiction rather than factual databases.98 Essentially, the inquiry
boils down to whether or not the work is creative or informational.99 This is
in line with the goals of copyright protection in the first place; original,
creative works lie within the core of copyright protection and it is this core
that should be protected to incentivize further creative works. Informational
works, or works based on factual events, do not require as much creative
talent. Giving monopoly power over works that are more grounded in fact
prohibits others from disseminating this information in other forms.
The amount and substantiality requirement, as noted in Harper &
Row, includes a discussion of both the absolute amount taken as well as
whether or not the important portions of the work were copied.100 There
96. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
97. Sag, supra note 93, at 56.
98. Brian Link, Drawing a Line in Alternate Universes: Exploring the Inadequacies of the Current
Four-Factor Fair Use Test through Chanslash, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 139, 154 (2010). Link describes the inquiry on nature as a “factional-fictional spectrum”, suggesting that courts afford more
protection to works that are more akin to fictional novels. This recognizes that not all works fit nicely
into a fictional or factual category, such that some works are more factual than others.
99. Sag, supra note 93, at 61.
100. When characters from a work are taken, courts have used either the “sufficiently delineated
test” or the “story being told test”. See Link, supra note 98, at 156–159. Link describes the sufficiently
delineated test, developed first in the Second Circuit, as one where courts examine “the detail in which
the previous works developed the physical and emotional characteristics, character traits, and the interrelationships of the characters.” Id. at 156–57. In other words, works that use characters from a previous
work, such as a sequel, fairly use those characters if the original had not already fleshed out their basic
personality and physical characteristics. On the other hand, the “story being told” test greatly limits
which characters are copyrightable. Only those characters that are the main, leading characters that tell
the story are protected under this test. See Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954) (“If the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not
within the area of protection afforded by copyright.”). As Link aptly observes, “Under this narrowly
drawn test, very few characters would be protected outside the original work”. Link supra note 93, at
159.
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currently exists no baseline threshold, above which leads to an inference of
infringement. Instead, a determination of when too much is taken often
depends on the individual work itself. For example, as discussed above,
Campbell specifically stressed in the context of parodies that an absolute
amount taken is inappropriate; instead, courts are to look at whether no
more than necessary was taken for parodies.101 Contrast the holding in
Campbell with Harper & Row, where a mere 300 words, or 13 percent of
the copyrighted article, were taken, yet this was found to militate in favor
of infringement given that the important parts of the memoir were taken.102
The final factor, the potential effect on the market or value of the
work, focuses on whether or not the infringing work will compete against
the original. Sag summarizes the effect factor as “an inquiry into competitive injury or lost sales.”103 Competitive injury could include a situation
where a competitor’s overall viability is increased, not necessarily at the
expense of but rather because of, an unauthorized copying of a protected
work. Other possible effects include market substitution or demand suppression that adversely impacts the original author’s potential market.104 In
other words, does the infringing work replace the market for the original so
that customers buy the infringing work instead of the original? This obviously also involves lost sale and revenues. If the infringing work competes
with the original in the marketplace, customers may opt to obtain the infringing work instead of the original. This is precisely the fear encountered
in A&M Records case in that users could potentially download music for
free instead of purchasing it legally.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Problems With the Current Method of Fair Use Decision-Making
Balancing tests are notoriously difficult to apply or predict, with litigants left at the mercy of the trier of fact as to how factors are balanced. In
fact, the uncertainty in how the fair use balancing test will be analyzed may
drive litigation that otherwise would never occur. The very unpredictability
and vagueness of fair use could lead both authors and infringers to firmly
stand their ground with the belief, reasonable or not, that the balancing test
will be resolved in their favor. At the other end of the spectrum, Rife notes
that the Supreme Court’s inability to clearly stake out the contours of fair
use creates an overly cautious fear of infringement that results in a sizable
101.
102.
103.
104.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985).
Id. at 64.
Link, supra note 98, at 159.
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reduction of legally fair uses that may be otherwise be educationally beneficial in universities.105 This is far less likely to happen in situation where
the rule is clear, with only room for interpretation at the margins. Potential
fair users of copyrighted works might be simply unwilling to fight for their
right to use works when faced with the massive potential liability if their
fair use calculus is incorrect.106 Thus, for many casual “infringers”, the
benefit of posting a random video on YouTube is certainly not worth the
risk of fighting a copyright takedown notice where the user derives no significant revenue from that use.
Courts, predictably, are all over the map when it comes to performing
the balancing test. As seen above, some emphasize the first factor, others
the fourth. Some gloss over or minimize the importance of one or more
factors. The danger in allowing a free-for-all balancing test is the temptation to minimize those factors in favor of the adverse party and emphasize
those in favor of the other.107 Intentional or not, the fair use balancing test
is susceptible to allowing the trier of fact to cherry pick factors in favor of
the winning litigant to achieve a result-driven decision rather than a purely
analytical one.108 Balancing tests in particular have been targeted as unprincipled, result-driven, and bad jurisprudence.109
105. Compare Id. at 168 with Rife, supra note 51, at 170–73. Rife persuasively argues that one
cause of fair use fear is a lack of education. She advocates that fair use should be taught not only in
“law” classes, but in writing classes as well, going so far as to advocate that fair use should be a learning outcome in writing classes where students are asked to critically apply the four factor tests in a
variety of writing-based situations to compensate for the lack of clarity in education. This, of course,
begs the questions as to exactly how best to educate on fair use when currently there is no uniform
understanding of how to apply these factors.
106. David Faguendes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2009); James
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887
(2007).
107. See Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REV.
513, 531 (2004) (“With its emphasis on the four stated factors, fair use is an explicitly result-oriented
doctrine”); Nimmer, supra note 56, at 281. Nimmer notes that courts make the fair use determination
first, and then align the four factors to coincide with that determination. Nimmer describes the situation
as one where, “the four factors fail to drive the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to
hang antecedent conclusions.”
108. Commentators see result-oriented rulings as undesirable when it appears as though the end
result, and not the process by which the ruling is reached, is the driving force behind the ultimate resolution. When rulings are unprincipled or done on a seemingly ad hoc basis, this gives rise to unacceptable result-driven rulings. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 187 (1984). Others have gone so far as to say that
result-driven jurisprudence is almost by definition unprincipled and problematic. Kyron Huigens, The
Continuity of Justification Defenses, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 627, 692 (2009). As James Gordon (2004)
succinctly puts it, ““A good result does not render the process lawful. Result-oriented jurisprudence is
unprincipled and inconsistent with the rule of law”. James D. Gordon, “Acorns and Oaks: Implied
rights of Action under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 72 (2004).
109. See Jon D. Michaels, Symposium: Law at the Intersection of National Security, Privacy, and
Technology, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1435, 1473, n.171 (2010); Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 354 (2006) (balancing tests are susceptible to “result-oriented malleability”); Leonard Weintraub, Crime of the
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More innocently, it is difficult in practice to weigh factors against
each other without some underlying, objective standard. If the nature of the
copyrighted work is creative but the amount used small, how do you weigh
those? Do those two essentially negate each other or does one of those
factors matter more than the other? As it stands now, there is no real guidance from courts as to how to balance the factors in the most appropriate
way.
The more difficult question concerns the intensity of the factors. Surely the relative strength or weakness of the factors must come in to play in
order to balance them together correctly. Putting a stone on each of the two
sides of a scale does not mean it is balanced – if one stone is larger than the
other, the scale will tip in that direction in spite of the fact each scale has
the same number of stones. In the fair use analysis, one factor might strongly weigh towards a finding for or against fair use, while other factors in the
same case weakly support one way or the other. Undoubtedly, any balancing test needs to incorporate the concept of intensity, so that a strong factor
outweighs a weak factor. But, the problem remains that no existing framework allows practitioners or courts to make these important determinations.
Should a strong creative work outweigh a small amount used? How do you
fix how strong or weak a nature, purpose or effect are? Or, to complicate
even further, how do you weigh a strong non-infringing purpose with a
weak creative infringing nature and a small, but measurable, effect on the
potential market? Does one strong factor outweigh two or three weak factors? As will be seen below, there is currently a mish-mash of analyses
used by courts that do not address this underlying problem, but simply
plow ahead and balance these factors loosely without any real solid logical
basis for the weighing.
B. The New Framework
In light of this inherent problem, a new approach to fair use is needed.
This article seeks to offer that new approach by designing a simple, yet
complete, framework within which the factors can be appropriately balanced with significant leeway for litigants to argue for or against any particular factor. This quantitative approach to fair use still uses elements of
qualitative analysis. The qualitative reasoning employed for each fair use
factor is then converted to a number value. The number values assigned to
each factor correlates with the relative strength each factor has for or
against fair use. In other words, the number values attached to each factor
Century: Use of the Mail Fraud Statute Against Authors, 67 B.U. L. REV. 507, 536 (1987) (“[t]he
balancing test is nothing more than a result-oriented test without any underlying principles for lower
courts to use.”).
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are still up for vigorous debate, but once those number values are determined, the framework provides a firm and discrete answer to the issue of
fair use.
To be clear, this framework is not intended to announce a new basis
for finding fair use or to replace existing interpretations of copyright law,
but instead is intended to complement it. Its purpose is to reflect, rather
than change, the prevailing legal views on fair use. Reforming the analytic
process of fair use can help to bring uniformity to fair use decisions and
bring some level of predictability into the fair use equation. The key in any
well-drafted precedential judicial decision is not so much the final outcome, but rather the roadmap used to arrive at the verdict.
With that constraint in mind, we proceed to the explanation of the new
approach to fair use. At bottom, a recognition that no factor is elevated in
importance by Section 107 is a beginning underlying assumption in this
proposal. The foundational underlying assumption inherent in this framework is the directive in Campbell that all factors should be considered
equally and the results should be weighed together.110 This might be contrary to actual practice, in that the first and fourth factors are highly correlated
with the overall finding of fair use.111 But, as will be seen, the framework
proposed herein would not necessarily deviate from those correlations, all
other things being equal.
The following chart represents how the new system is to be applied:112
Fair
Factor

Use

1

2

3

(Strong Fair use)

(Weak Fair use)

(Weak
ment)

4
Infringe-

(Strong
ment)

Purpose
Nature
Amount
Effect

Each factor is given a separate numerical grade signifying its relative
strength or weakness for fair use. The lower the number assigned, the more

110. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
111. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582–86 (2008).
112. For ease of reference, these factors hereinafter will be labeled, “purpose”, “nature”, “amount”,
and “effect”.

Infringe-
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likely fair use is a successful defense. The higher number grades represent
a finding that would negate fair use. In most cases, there is not a clear-cut,
definitive answer for any of these. Often, for example, an infringing use
may have some elements of commercial and educational uses together.
And, not all transformations of original works are equal – some are slightly
transformational while others make more wholesale changes. As it stands
now, courts are forced to make a murky, vague determination that the purpose, for example, weighs in favor of one side or the other without taking
into account that some purposes are stronger than others.
Each of the four fair use factors receives a grade ranging from 1-4. A
grade of 1 or 4 indicates a strong non-infringing or infringing finding, respectively. Alternatively, factors in which both infringing and noninfringing elements are present now have a way to be accurately described.
A grade of 2 means that while the factor is predominately non-infringing,
there is some aspect of the use that has an infringing character. The opposite is true for a grade of 3.
This framework introduces the concept of a continuum-based approach to fair use that recognizes that not all purposes, natures, amounts
and effects are definitively infringing or non-infringing. It allows triers of
fact to incorporate, for example, multiple purposes in the fair use analysis.
This crucial piece is missing from much of the analysis in the jurisprudence. Quite simply, a strong infringing purpose should have more weight
than a weak infringing purpose. This framework allows the trier of fact to
make that qualitative judgment as to the intensity of each factor and then
weigh each factor accordingly. Importantly, the framework ensures all
factors are considered, rather than having the purpose of the use singlehandedly control the outcome. The danger that is ever present within the
current way fair use decisions are adjudged is that those factors that do not
comport with the final fair use determination will either be, at best, minimized or at worst, ignored. This framework allows all factors, even those
adverse to the final decision, to be fully considered.
C. How the Framework Works
The new approach to fair use allows triers of fact to examine each of
the four fair use factors and give grades on a continuum that represent their
relative strength or weakness in the fair use context. In light of this, a grade
of “1” indicates the strongest non-infringing purpose. These are situations
where the works are highly transformative and with a non-commercial use.
For example, a court has leeway to give a “1” grade to those highly transformative works if the transformation is so overwhelming that it trumps
whether or not the purpose also has a commercial element. Thus, courts can
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still emphasize and follow Campbell by assigning a grade of “1” for the
purpose where a significant transformative use is found. Or, a grade of “1”
would be assigned for the amount when the subsequent work uses the entirety of the original.113
A grade of “2” recognizes that while a use may be transformative
and/or educational, it is not overwhelming. This would apply where perhaps the transformative use still retained some elements of the original, or
where the commercial purpose of the use does not totally counteract the
transformational nature of the new work. A grade of “2” still leans towards
a finding of fair use, but distinguishes those uses that are not transformative
in the extreme.
A grade of “3” indicates a weak finding of infringement. This would
apply in a situation where a musician writes an educational song for children whose lyrics are all 50 states and capitals. While songs are inherently
creative114, given the musical accompaniment and the arrangement of the
lyrics, the states and capitals themselves are merely informational and do
not require any creativity whatsoever. A grade of “3” might be appropriate
for the nature of the copyrighted work where the lyrics are predominately
informational but the overall beat and music of the song is creative.
Finally, a grade of “4” demonstrates a strong infringing use. In the
A&M Records case, Napster users were engaging in massive copyright
infringement to obtain copyrighted music without having to buy it through
the marketplace.115 Clearly, this had a palpable effect on music sales; when
music can be obtained for free on the Internet, these users no longer have
the incentive to legally purchase this same music that, but for the presence
of the illegal peer-to-peer file sharing service, customers would otherwise
buy. Such illegal downloads clearly diminish the value of the copyrighted
work and reduce the total revenue authors would normally receive for use
of their works. Consequently, a trier of fact could assign a grade of “4”
under effect.
These grades are not and cannot always be objectively fixed. In many
instances, the litigants will have to argue between one of two grades, such
as whether or not the transformative use of the second work is weak or
strong, thereby justifying a “1” or a “2”. This is really no different from the
analysis as it stands now, but it allows the litigants to avoid having to play
113. A grade of “1” also applies for the nature and effect, where the nature of the work is very
creative or where there is little to no effect on the value of the work in the potential market. To avoid
duplicity, the discussion of the grades hereinafter will be limited to a few examples rather than a redundant and/or obvious discussion of how each grade could apply to each factor.
114. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g., 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th
Cir. 2008).
115. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2001).
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a zero-sum game of arguing each factor either being in its favor or against
it. Instead, a litigant may be able to accurately and more persuasively concede that, for example, the amount taken was substantial and the factor
works against him, but instead the grade should only be a “3” rather than a
“4”.
After assigning the grades for each row, the next step is to simply add
the numerical grades.116 The dividing line between infringement and fair
use is 10.117 Therefore, any sum that is less than 10 indicates that the fair
use defense should be successful and the defendant should be allowed to
continue to use the copyrighted work. A sum greater than 10 negates the
fair use defense and indicates the defendant has infringed on the plaintiff’s
original work. Importantly, once the analysis of each row and grade assignment has been completed, no further interpretation should occur. The
numbers are what they are, so to speak, and whatever final value is elicited
mandates a finding either for or against fair use. This system allows an
effective balancing of the four factors and allows for the intensity of each
of these factors to be taken into account.
This, of course, begs the question of how to resolve the dispute if the
sum of the four factors is exactly 10. A tiebreaker method should be employed to reach a conclusion for sums of 10. It is true that a variety of different tiebreakers could be used.118 However, the method that best
comports with Campbell involves simply to make the purpose the tiebreaking factor.119 There is no doubt that Campbell stressed the relative importance of transformative uses over other factors.120 Therefore, when the
final result is 10, whichever litigant “wins” the purpose analysis wins the
case. In other words, for those sums that equal 10, when the purpose grade

116. So, if the trier of fact assigns a grade of “2” for purpose, “3” for nature, “2” for amount and
“1” for effect, the sum would be 8.
117. 10 is simply the breakeven point. The average grade assignable for each column is 2.5. There
are four different rows to be assigned, so that the average total score is 10.
118. For example, if 3 of 4 factors weigh in one direction, the tiebreaker could be given to the side
with three factors. This would apply in a 3-3-3-1 or 2-2-2-4 split, with the side earning the 3s or 2s
respectively winning. Or, a tiebreaker could be given to the side that has the most 1s or 4s, arguing that
a side with extreme strong infringing or non-infringing uses should be given the benefit of the doubt.
119. It could be argued that factor 4, the effect, and not the purpose is more appropriately the
tiebreaking factor in light of the Supreme Court’s declaration in Harper & Row, that the fourth factor is
the most important fair use factor. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 539–
42 (1985). However, in light of Campbell’s subtle rejection of Harper & Row’s reliance on the fourth
factor and the elevation of the transformative purpose as the key factor, it makes more sense to give
special tiebreaking privileges to the fourth factor. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–84.
120. Specifically, transformative uses are at the “heart” of fair use’s protections and the more
transformative a work is, the less other factors are significant. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Therefore, if
a finding on one factor leads to a finding that others are less significant, the first factor is of greater
relative importance.
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is “1” or “2”, the result is a finding of fair use. When the purpose grade is a
“3” or a “4”, the result is that fair use is negated as a defense.
The tiebreaking procedure has the extra benefit of staying true to the
jurisprudence while at the same time achieving the equalized balancing
test. As noted by Netanel, lower courts have consistently, whether consciously or not, interpreted Campbell as a directive to elevate the purpose
of the use as one of greater importance.121 It certainly appears that the emphasis placed on the purpose may be too extreme, given the correlation
between winning the purpose argument and wining the overall fair use
debate. At the end of the day, Campbell still stressed that all factors are to
be explored and weighed. The method used here allows the purpose to still
have greater impact than the others, given the possibility that the outcome
might be exactly ten,122 while at the same time not giving the purpose such
an enormous advantage so that it overshadows the other three factors.
The framework endorsed herein allows results to occur that might not
be reached otherwise. Suppose a trier of fact completes the analysis and
reaches a 3-4-1-1 result. The result is 9, meaning fair use should be found.
But, if too much emphasis is placed on purpose, it is quite possible that the
trier of fact will simply see a 2-2 split, see purpose as the important factor,
and find for the plaintiff on infringement.123 Or, in a case where the result is
a 4-2-2-2 (a result of 10), the balancing test might be applied to reach a
conclusion of fair use since 3 factors weigh in favor of fair use while only
one does not. Such an analysis would not consider the relative strength and
weakness of the factors. Given that the purpose is more important and is
the tiebreaker, the fact the purpose is a 4 would hand a victory over to the
plaintiff and negate a finding of fair use.
Certainly, other methods could be used to create similar frameworks,
but other options either lack simplicity or consistency with Campbell. For
example, a scale of 1-10, instead of 1-4 could be used, giving the trier of
fact greater specificity to pinpoint the exact degree of infringement.124 But,
the problem dealing with such minute increments is the inability to really
121. Netanel found a substantial increase in fair use findings when the court analyzing the case
found a transformative use as enunciated in Campbell – this was in line with the recent general trend to
discuss and analyze the case using a transformative use when analyzing the purpose. See Netanel, supra
note 55, at 740.
122. There are quite a few combinations that equal 10, such as 3-3-3-1, 4-3-2-1, 4-2-2-2, 4-4-1-1,
and 3-3-2-2.
123. A similar outcome might be reached on a 1-4-4-4- split. If a trier of fact simply blindly sees a
strong transformative use and relies on Campbell for the proposition that a transformative use should be
given special consideration, the result would be a finding of fair use and thereby totally disregarding the
strength of the other three factors in favor of infringement.
124. Or, a system of decimals could be used in the standard 1-4 framework, so that, for example, a
1.5 could be assigned. In reality, that is no different from the 1-10 system and suffers from the same
drawback.
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be able to put objective grades on subjective factors. How can one really
discern the difference between a grade of 7 and 8? Such small increments
are really not distinguishable when dealing with, for example, the nature of
the use. On the other hand, the simpler strong/weak dichotomy is something that is easily distinguishable and intuitive. The goal herein is to make
a framework that simplifies rather than complicates the trier of fact’s decision.
Another possibility is to emphasize either the first or fourth factors, or
both, within the confines of the framework itself. So, for example, the possible grades for purpose could be -1, 0, 5, or 6, with 1-4 for the other three
factors.125 This would augment the relative importance of the first factor by
giving purpose a more extreme range of points that can be assigned. The
justification behind such a system would be the importance placed on transformative use in the jurisprudence; however, this system suffers from the
fatal flaw of not staying true to Campbell’s holding that the four factors
should be weighed together. The purpose still has some extra prominence
in that it is a tiebreaker, but giving it additional weight strays too far from
the core holding of Campbell.
III. APPLICATION
Applying this new analysis to already rendered decisions shows how
effective the framework is. In many cases, the framework confirms the
Court’s decision and would have given the Court a firmer legal basis from
which to render a decision. As will be seen, there are cases that quite possibly would have been decided differently had this method been utilized. In
the analysis used below, it is important to note that the author may have to
make some independent judgment when the facts or the court’s reasoning
could support two different grades.
A. Hofheinz v. A&E
In Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, the copyright holders of the
film “It Conquered the World”, starring Peter Graves, sued A&E and its
program “Biography.” “Biography” features an hour-long biographical
feature on a particular celebrity.126 On this particular episode, “Biography”
featured Peter Graves and in doing so, aired a portion of “It Conquered the

125. The breakeven point would remain 10 in such a system. However, a finding of a noninfringing
purpose would reduce the overall sum and require higher grades from the other three factors to reach
10. So, in the standard system, a score of 1-3-3-4 would be infringing, while in this system a score of (1)-3-3-4 would equal 9 and a finding of fair use.
126. Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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World,” without permission, to illustrate some of his earlier works.127 In an
interview with Graves aired on the program, he implies that “It Conquered
the World” was not a serious film and was a part that he took to “buy the
groceries.”128 This episode of “Biography” was 44 minutes long and used
20 seconds of various scenes from “It Conquered the World.”129 “It Conquered the World” lasts approximately 70 minutes.130 Additionally, the film
was no longer available through video rental, but plaintiff did rent it for
special showings and film festivals. 131
The District Court examined all four fair use factors and made a
judgment as to how all four weighed, even including a discussion of
whether or not the factors weighed “slightly” one way or the other. First,
the Court found that A&E’s use of the film was transformative in that the
purpose of A&E’s use was to provide details in a biography, whereas the
original was intended for theatrical entertainment.132 As a result, the Court
found that the purpose of the use “tips in favor of A&E.”133 The Court did
not discuss the commerciality of the use, instead opting to rely solely on
the transformative nature of the work. In light of the commercial context of
the film - it was shown on a for-profit network – a grade of “2” is appropriate.
Next, the Court stated that “It Conquered the World” is certainly a
creative work and thus the factor “tipped slightly” in favor of the plaintiff.134 The Court justified weighing this factor only slightly towards the
plaintiff because the work was out of circulation. In light of this, a grade of
“3” is appropriate.
As for the amount, the Court emphasized that less than 1% of the film
was used and the 20 seconds of film was cut in such a way to make it virtually impossible to follow along with the film’s plot.135 The Court found that
the factor “cuts in defendants’ favor.”136 Since such a small and insubstantial portion of the film was used, a grade of “1” is appropriate.

127. Id. at 443 “It Conquered the World” was a science fiction film where Peter Graves played the
role of a scientist.
128. Id. at 444.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 444–45.
132. Id. at 446. As the Court succinctly stated, “The 20 seconds of footage shown of that appearance in defendants’ biography was not shown to recreate the creative expression reposing in plaintiff’s
film, it was for the transformative purpose of enabling the viewer to understand the actor’s modest
beginnings in the film business.” Id. at 446–47.
133. Id. at 446–47.
134. Id. at 447.
135. Id. at 448.
136. Id.
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Finally, the Court reasoned that because the movie was not available
for mass rental, nor was the 20 second clip a substitute for the original, the
airing on “Biography” did not affect the market for the film.137 As a result,
the Court found that this factor “favors A&E as well.”138 So, given the total
lack of evidence in favor of the plaintiff on this point, a “1” should be assigned for effect.
Adding all of the number values leads to a sum of 7, meaning A&E’s
use of this clip was a fair use.139 This confirms the ruling of the Court. Interestingly, the Court implicitly recognized the need to not only balance the
factors together, but to also consider their intensity by using words such as
“tips” and “slightly” when making the fair use determination. As the
Court’s opinion reads, it is simply unclear as to how the Court makes the
jump from the analysis of the factors to the end conclusion. The Court
merely lays out the factors and then, without any further discussion, grants
A&E’s motion for summary judgment without explaining how all four
factors relate. This article’s proposed framework provides that missing, but
crucial, analytical piece that justifies the finding of fair use.
B. Associated Press v. Meltwater
The case of Associated Press v. Meltwater involves a situation where
the Court held the fair use defense did not apply.140 The Associated Press
(AP) is a news organization that produces between 1,000 and 2,000 news
articles.141 The AP then licenses these articles to third parties who disseminate them through various online outlets.142 Defendant Meltwater is a news
monitoring service with 4,000 U.S. customers.143 Meltwater’s service operated as a kind of search engine where users could search for key terms in
news articles.144 Meltwater’s system would then copy news articles, including AP articles, and deliver the articles to their subscribers.145 Although
only excerpts of news articles were copied and provided to subscribers, as
much as 60 percent of a given article could have been copied.146 Its design
was to provide a “news clipping” service that allowed users to see only the

137.
138.
139.
140.
2013).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 449.
Id.
2+3+1+1=7.
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
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pertinent part of the article rather than having to read an entire article to
glean the desired parts.147
The Court proceeded to balance the four fair use factors. The Court
found that Meltwater’s use was not transformative. Meltwater’s search
engine was designed to deliver news to its subscribers, but only those excerpts that were germane to that user.148 Meltwater added no commentary
or insight into the AP stories, but instead copied them verbatim.149Meltwater’s purpose behind providing this material to its users was the same as
AP’s purpose – to convey news and information to its users. Instead, the
Court found that Meltwater “repackages,” rather than transforms, the original work.150 Given the Meltwater’s use was not transformative and that
Meltwater is a commercial, for-profit enterprise, a grade of “4” is assigned
for the purpose.
As for the nature of the copyrighted work, the Court admitted that the
news stories were both factual and published and as a result found that the
factor weighed in favor of fair use.151 The Court cited Nihon v. Comline152
for the proposition that this factor is “at most neutral on the question of fair
use.”153 This proposition runs wholly contrary to the notion of a balancing
test and is certainly unsupported by Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
nature of the work is just as important in the proposed framework and
should be considered equally. Consequently, a grade of “1” is assigned for
the nature, since there is little creativity in the AP news articles.
For the amount, the Court discussed both the qualitative and quantitative copying. Meltwater never copied the entire story, which would have
defeated the purpose of Meltwater’s service. Instead, it copied anywhere
from 4.5 to 60 percent of any given article.154 Additionally, Meltwater always took the lede of every article it copied, which the Court described as
the heart of the story.155 The Court found that this factor “weighs strongly
against a finding of fair use”.156 As such, a grade of “4” is appropriate.157
147. Id. at 554.
148. Id. at 552.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 556.
151. Id. at 557.
152. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1999).
153. Associated Press, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
154. Id. at 558.
155. Id. The lede is the opening sentence of any AP article and takes some journalistic creativity to
write.
156. Id.
157. This article seeks to follow the Court’s reasoning as much as possible, and here, the Court
leaves little doubt that it believes the amount factor is a strong infringing factor worthy of a grade of
“4”. However, in light of the fact that nowhere near all of the work was copied, a grade of “3” might
have been easier to justify. Additionally, while the lede is certainly creative, it is hard to say that the
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Lastly, the Court found the effect factor weighed strongly against a
finding of fair use. AP and Meltwater are essentially competitors, and
Meltwater does not license AP’s work to distribute to its users like other
third party websites.158 Meltwater obtained an “unfair commercial advantage” by not licensing these copyrighted work, which is how AP derives
a large amount of its revenue.159 So, a grade of “4” is appropriate for the
effect.
Adding the grades together gives a sum of 13, meaning fair use is not
available to Meltwater.160 This comports with the Court’s ruling, but the
proposed framework allows the Court to dispense with the silly notion that
one factor, the nature, is neutral at best. Credit can still be given for the
informational nature of the work without having to worry that the overall
calculus will be skewed in the wrong direction.
C. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.
The plaintiff, Derek Seltzer, is an artist that created a work entitled
“Scream Icon” in 2003.161 It is a very distinctive picture of a “screaming,
contorted face.”162 Many copies of Scream Icon have been placed on walls
in Los Angeles as graffiti or street art.163 In 2008, Roger Staub, the video
designer for Green Day, took a picture of a weathered copy of Scream Icon
found on a brick wall.164 Later, Staub used the picture of Scream Icon in a
4-minue video for one of Green Day’s songs, “East Jesus Nowhere.” Although it is slightly modified from its original form in the video, it remains
clearly identifiable and is present in the middle of the screen in the video
and stays throughout the entire video.165 The video was played as a backdrop at seventy Green Day concerts in 2009.166 The following copyright
infringement litigation ensued.
The Court found that the purpose of the use weighed in Green Day’s
favor. The Court found that the use of Scream Icon in the video was transformative in that the picture was used as part of Green Day’s video to illustrate notions of religious hypocrisy, whereas the original was a reflection of
opening sentence of any article is always going to be the most important part. As Meltwater’s system
illustrates, the important parts of the article depend on the user reading it.
158. Id. at 561.
159. Id.
160. 4+1+4+4=13.
161. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (Green Day is a famous and successful rock band).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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“youth culture.”167 The Court relied on the fact that there was a new expressive content or message with Green Day’s use and that Green Day
transformed its original content to one that expresses outrage towards religion.168 Further, the Court found that the use of the work in the video backdrop was only “incidentally commercial,” since there was no direct profit
or revenue gained from the use of the video.169 This is a close call on the
grade to be assigned, but since the work was not overly transformative and
was still slightly commercial a grade of “2” is to be assigned.
However, it could be contended that there is little transformation in
this at all – both were used as works of creative expression, and what the
expressive content behind its use within or without the video is arbitrary at
best. The Scream Icon is still readily identifiable throughout the video and
is being used to promote some artistic expression and not for a totally different purpose, such as news reporting. Thus, the author contends that,
under these facts, a grade of “3” for purpose is more appropriate.
Next, the Court left little doubt that Scream Icon was extremely creative, but mitigated this finding given that the work had already been published and widely disseminated prior to it being used by Green Day.170 As a
result, this factor weighed “slightly” in Seltzer’s favor and thus a grade of
“3” is appropriate.171
Third, the Court found that the amount factor did not weigh against
Green Day because the picture is incapable of being divisible.172 Since
Green Day necessarily needed to take the entire original to make its point,
it took no more than was necessary. A grade of “2” is given for the amount
factor, since the entirety of the work was appropriated.
This grade is very debatable. The Court seems to confuse parody and
non-parody. For parody, the second work by its very nature takes some of
the original in order to cast a humorous slant towards the original.173 Here,
Green Day was not parodying or satirizing the original, so there was no
longer any need to reference back to the original. In the author’s view, a
grade of “4” would be more appropriate given that the entire work was
taken.
167. Id. at 1177.
168. Id. This finding presumes that there is some objective basis with which to determine what the
exact expressive message is inherent in a work of art. It further presumes that the artist, and not the
viewer, determines what the expressive meaning of a work of art is. Who is to say, for example, that a
viewer of Scream Icon also could not have interpreted it as a diatribe against religion, just as Roger
Staub apparently did?
169. Id. at 1178.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1178–79.
173. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599-600 (1994).
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For the effect, the Court found that Scream Icon lost none of its market value and Green Day never used Scream Icon as part of its merchandise, albums, or promotional materials.174 Thus, the Court found that the
fourth factor weighed in Green Day’s favor and a grade of “1” is appropriate given the total lack of evidence that this use affected the potential value
of Scream Icon.175
The final grade is “8.”176 Once again, the proposed framework confirms the Court’s finding of fair use. The Court noted that Green Day did
not win on all four factors, but did emphasize that it did win on both the
first and fourth factors, which are “generally viewed as the most important
factors”.177 Once again, the factors should be balanced and Campbell
stresses no one factor is more important than the others. Without a framework as the one proposed, however, it is very difficult to conceptualize
how these factors weigh against each other and is very easy to fall into the
trap of emphasizing the factors that best support the result reached. Using
this framework eliminates that analytical pitfall and allows for a more reasoned approach.
On the other hand, if the author’s interpretation of the amount factor
were used – giving the amount a grade of “4” instead of “2”, the result
would be 10. In that case, the tiebreaker would be the purpose, which was
found to be in favor of a finding of fair use. If both the purpose and the
amount were changed to reflect the author’s reasonable views, the sum
would be 11 (3-3-4-1) and there would be a finding of infringement. So, it
is clear that the way in which a court accepts or discards reasonable interpretations of the factors goes a long way to the ultimate determination of
fair use.
D. Gaylord v. U.S.
Plaintiff Frank Gaylord, a sculptor, created a work of art called The
Column to honor veterans of the Korean War.178 The sculpture consisted of
19 life-sized stainless steel soldiers arranged in a unique formation and was
part of an official government memorial for Korean War veterans.179 Later,
the United States Postal Service issued a stamp commemorating the Korean

174. Seltzer, 725 F. 3d. at 1179.
175. If anything, Green Day’s use of Scream Icon might actually have a positive impact on the
value of the work, since Seltzer’s work is being seen by people who otherwise might not have been
aware of its existence.
176. 2+3+2+1=8.
177. Id. at 1180.
178. Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
179. Id.
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War that featured Mr. Gaylord’s sculpture.180 The stamp showed the actual
sculpture, including 14 of the 19 soldiers, taken during a snowstorm.181 The
Postal Service generated nearly 17 million dollars in sales from this stamp,
5.4 million of which came from collectors that never used the stamp for
postage.182 Mr. Gaylord sued the Postal Service for copyright infringement.
The lower court in the case found that the Postal Service’s incorporation of The Column in its stamp was a fair use, but that holding was reversed on appeal.183 The Court disagreed with the lower court that the
purpose of the use was transformative. The lower court found that since the
stamp featured subdued lighting and the added effect of the snowstorm, it
added a “surreal” expression to the work that was not present in the original.184 The Court noted that the stamp was not being used as part of a biographical work that would present a more transformative use; instead, the
Court found that the intrinsic purpose of both The Column and the stamp
was to “honor veterans of the Korean War.”185 Also, the Court found that
the since the Postal Service generated 17 million dollars, the stamp “clearly
has a commercial purpose”.186 Combining these two findings, the Court
found that the purpose “strongly” weighed against fair use, and consequently, a grade of “4” is assigned.
Next, the Court found that the sculpture was “expressive and creative”, but since the work had been published, this factor simply weighed
against fair use.187 Therefore, a grade of “3” should be assigned. As for the
amount factor, only 14 of the 19 statutes were used in the stamp, the stamp
including the focus of The Column. This factor weighed against fair use
and thus a grade of “3” is assigned188 Although this is a closer call, a grade
of “3” takes into account that not all of The Column was used in the stamp.
As for the effect, the Court agreed with the lower court and found that
this factor weighed in favor of fair use. Even Mr. Gaylord admitted that the
stamp actually increased the visibility and popularity, rather than diminished, the value of his work.189 The stamp and the actual sculptures were

180. Id. at 1370.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1371.
183. As this was a suit against the government, the lower court in this case was the Court of Federal
Claims.
184. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1373.
185. Id. Further, the Court was not persuaded that the snowstorm had any effect on the purpose of
the use, stating, “[n]ature’s decision to snow cannot deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to
exclude.” Id. at 1374.
186. Id. at 1374.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1375.
189. Id.
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not market substitutes and thus no effect on the stamp’s value occurred
because of the infringement.190 So, with no market impact, a grade of “1” is
assigned.
Therefore, the stamp’s use of The Column has a total grade of 11, confirming the finding of infringement.191 The Court held, “Weighing the factors, we conclude that the government’s use of The Column in the stamp
was not a fair use.”192 And, that was it. The weighing/balancing done by the
Court consisted of an astounding one sentence, without any mention of
how the intensity of the factors mix, nor a discussion of why a total lack of
market impact does not mandate a fair use finding. Notably, had the Court
adopted the lower court’s finding on purpose, the result would have been
different. A finding of a “1” or a “2” for purpose reduces the final score
below 9, and illustrates the point of how a variance in simply one factor can
change the entire balancing test.
E. Warren Publishing v. Spurlock193
Plaintiff James Warren published a variety of magazines devoted to
movie monsters in the 1950s and 1960s.194 Warren commissioned several
artists to design the covers for his magazine, including Basil Gogos.195
Gogos designed nearly 50 covers of the magazine, more than any other
artist.196 Defendant Spurlock decided in 2004 to publish a book on the life
of Basil Gogos and approached Warren to inquire on a possible collaborative project; however, no deal was ever reached.197 Even though negotiations fell through, Spurlock used at least 24 of Gogos’ magazine covers in
his book to illustrate the Gogos’ life, ten of which were exact reproductions.198 Warren filed suit for copyright infringement, with Spurlock arguing this was a fair use of plaintiff’s work.199
For the purpose of the use, the Court found that Spurlock ultimately
did transform the original. However, the Court noted that this was not
clear-cut, given that Spurlock made exact reproductions of the original in

190. Id. To support this conclusion, the Court surmises that the fans of the stamp would not cease
to take photographs of The Column simply because they already have a stamp with a depiction of it.
191. 4+3+3+1=11.
192. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1376.
193. Warren Publ’g. Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
194. Id. at 405.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 406.
198. Id. For purposes of summary judgment, Spurlock conceded that Warren owned the copyrights
in all of Gogos’ magazine covers.
199. Id at 411.
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an effort to improve his commercial book.200 At the end of the day, the
Court rested its conclusion on the fact that the original work was used to
sell movie monster magazines, while the second use was to illustrate a
biographical account of the evolution of his work “in order to pay homage
to his accomplishments.”201 As a result, the Court found that the purpose of
the use was transformative and “weigh heavily in favor of Spurlock”, despite the fact that the Court began its fair use discussion noting that there
were some characteristics of the use that did not support fair use.202
This is an excellent example of where the proposed framework would
be very helpful to elucidate the Court’s opinion. The Court’s statements
seem contradictory. It is hard to imagine how the purpose of the use could
weigh “heavily” in favor of Spurlock when the Court openly admitted that
some of the evidence points in Warren’s favor. Had the Court been able to
assign a grade, the litigants would have had no doubt determining the exact
factual finding on purpose – as it currently stands, it is unclear at best. Given that some characteristics lean towards a finding of infringement, a grade
of “2” is assigned.203
For the nature, the Court found that the original artwork is certainly
creative, and this creative nature was not undermined by the fact that the
magazine covers were long since out-of-print.204 Here, though, the Court
found that, “this factor weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiffs, but it is of
limited relevance because of the prior finding that Spurlock’s work is transformative.”205 This analysis is backwards – the Court balanced the factors
together before the actual grade was awarded. The assigning of grades or
determination of the four factors should be independently judged, given
Campbell’s instruction that the four factors should be balanced equally.
Once again, the proposed framework corrects this potential error in analysis
by allowing the trier of fact to assign grades first, and then allow the
framework to objectively balance the factors. Here, the appropriate grade
for the nature should be a “4”, despite the Court’s declaration that the nature only weighed “slightly” in plaintiff’s favor. Otherwise, arguing that the
nature weighs slightly in favor of infringement because of the finding on
purpose does not allow for proper balancing. Analyzing the factors that

200. Id. at 418.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 422.
203. Admittedly, the Court may very well have intended a grade of “1”, but such a grade should be
reserved only for those findings where all signs point to fair use.
204. Warren Publ’g. Co. 645 F. Supp. 2d at 423. The Court noted that, as a periodical, the magazines themselves have a limited time of demand, thus the fact that each is technically “out-of-print” is
not relevant to the question for the nature of the work. Id.
205. Id.
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way allows the purpose to effectively subsume and control the nature, departing from the Supreme Court’s intent in Campbell.
For the amount, the Court was persuaded by Spurlock’s argument that
the magazine covers consisted of 1 to 1.5 percent of the total material in the
magazine, which was a relatively miniscule amount.206 Further, the heart of
the work was not the covers, according to the Court, but rather the content
of the magazines.207 Having found that neither the qualitative nor quantitative aspect of the third factor favored infringement, the Court ruled that the
third factor weighed “in favor of Spurlock.”208 In light of this finding, a
grade of “1” should be assigned.
For the effect, the Court found that it weighed “slightly” in favor of
plaintiffs, but only because there was a genuine issue of material fact raised
by Warren as to the potential impact on the value of the work or future
derivative works.209 Warren contended that he intended on creating a coffee-table book that would detail the history of monster magazines, which
would utilize some of the Gogos magazine covers.210 According to plaintiff’s experts, the Gogos book could be a market substitute for his future
book, or, if the Gogos book performed poorly, could “poison” the market
for his coffee table book.211 Given the uncertainty of these factual assertions, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court found that these were
possible market impacts and found that the effect factor weighed “slightly”
in favor of Warren.212 As a slight effect only, a grade of “3” should be assigned.
Adding the sums up leaves a grade of “10”, which is of course a tie.213
The tiebreaker to be used is the purpose. Since the purpose effect was de-

206. Id. at 424. The Court rejected Warren’s argument that each of the magazine covers constituted
a separate copyrightable work, meaning that Spurlock would have taken 100 percent of the work when
he made exact reproductions. That argument has some force given that the magazine cover is a distinct
work of art apart from the rest of the work. However, unlike in Harper & Row, where the excerpts
taken from the unpublished memoirs were part and parcel of the entire work, the magazine covers have
a unique and distinct character. Id. at 427. The covers were designed by artists such as Gogos and the
rest of the magazine was presumably created by someone else. Id. at 406. Regardless, the Court does
have a justifiable basis for reasoning that the amount was relatively small.
207. Id. at 424.
208. Id. Curiously, the Court did not find that this factor weighed “heavily” or “strongly”, even
though both aspects of the amount factor weighed substantially in Spurlock’s favor.
209. Id. at 428.
210. Id. at 425.
211. Id. at 427.
212. Id. at 428. The effect was only “slightly” in favor of Warren because Warren’s neglect to
make this book for 22 years cast serious doubt on his intent to actually write and/or sell this book. Id. at
423.
213. 2+4+1+3=10.
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termined to be in favor of Spurlock, the end result is fair use.214 The
framework allows for the factors to be appropriately balanced and, as the
saying goes, “let the chips fall where they may”. The fair use finding was
still confirmed, but using this framework allows a court to more objectively
and qualitatively reach its conclusion without making vague assertions that
it “weighed the factors and considering the purposes of copyright”.215 Such
vague platitudes allow a trier of fact to easily reach the result desired rather
than allowing the process to logically flow to the conclusion. In the end, the
Court’s decision is still confirmed by the framework, but it should be noted
that this was an extremely close case that could have quite easily have gone
the other way. If, for example, the Court had found that the magazine covers were the heart of the magazines, thus justifying at least a “2” for the
amount, this would have tipped the scales in favor of infringement.
F. Sony v. Universal
Next, the alleged copyright infringement in Sony offers insight as to
how the analysis used in that decision may have looked strikingly different
using this framework. The Court clearly found that the purpose of the use
was both nonprofit and noncommercial.216 Specifically, the Court relied on
the fact that private parties watching programming from the comfort of
their own homes had no commercial use.217This case was decided before
the transformative use doctrine was introduced, so the Court in Sony did
not discuss it. However, it is hard to cError! Bookmark not defined.onceive a way in which verbatim copying of a television show in any
way transforms the original. It is the exact same program, watched on the
same medium (television) for the same purpose (entertainment). Given that
the emphasis on the transformative use of the work, and the fact that VTR
copying simply does not transform the work, a grade of “3” or “4” seems
reasonable. A “3” appears more apt, since the noncommercial purpose certainly does militate against a finding of a strong infringing purpose.
As noted in Sony itself, the nature of the work and the amount used
both tend towards a finding of infringement. Television shows are creative
by their nature; on the other hand, sporting events and documentaries are
not. Therefore, a grade of “3” seems appropriate to indicate a weak infringing nature. The amount, on the other hand, is all of the work. A grade of
214. The purpose was a “2”, meaning that there was a weak finding in favor of fair use. Once
again, for tiebreaking purposes, a “1” or a “2” grade in purpose gives the victory to the side arguing fair
use, while a grade of “3” or “4” gives the victory to the side arguing infringement.
215. Id. at 428.
216. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
217. Had the Court rendered its ruling based solely on its commercial nature and on its transformative uses, there is little doubt the purpose would have received a grade of “1”.
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“4” is appropriate for the amount. Finally, the Court noted that the effect of
the VTR copying has no impact on the potential market or value of these
works. Thus, a grade of “1” is appropriate.
Adding all of these grades leaves a sum of 11.218 Thus, using this
framework and the emphasis on the transformative use, a contrary result is
reached from the Sony Court’s decision.219 Certainly, it is possible to envision a scenario where the Supreme Court, faced with the facts of Sony in a
new case, could conceivably reverse itself on the fair use issue.220
G. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises
The Harper & Row case is an even better illustration of how the
framework could augment a court’s ruling. As for purpose, The Nation
certainly did not transform the memoirs, but instead lifted them directly
from Harper & Row’s copyrighted work.221 The Nation used it for the same
news reporting purpose that Harper & Row would have used it.222 Also,
given the reliance on the fact that The Nation stole these memoirs to use
them, a grade of “4” seems appropriate. This comports with the Court’s
overall view of the purpose.223
Secondly, the facts in the memoirs themselves were not creative, but
the most the expressive elements within the work were appropriated. Also,
since this was an unpublished work, its nature was one that gives rise to
higher copyright protection. A grade of a weak infringing “3” seems correct, which takes into account that the memoirs are facts and not overly
creative. Next, the amount of the work taken was small; however, the important parts of the work were the ones The Nation used. Once again, a
finding of “3” is assigned that takes into account both the amount and sub-

218. 3+3+4+1=11.
219. However, should the Court’s reliance on the noncommercial purpose of the use be solely
considered, a grade of “1” in purpose would leave a sum of “9”, meaning that fair use would apply.
220. It is important to note, though, that the Sony Court relied on two independent holdings to reach
its conclusion that VTRs were not liable for contributory infringement. Id. at 455. The Court found that
licensees of television programming have likely consented to time-shifting and that this was not a case
of infringement at all. Id. at 443–446. Given that television users are paying for the right to watch a
show one time, it makes no difference at what time the user actually watches the show. Thus, the argument goes that time-shifting is not infringement at all, thus making the fair use determination ultimately
irrelevant.
221. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 539 (1985).
222. Id. at 561.
223. Certainly, a grade of “3” could be argued in that news reporting might be a noncommercial
purpose. However, the Nation still is a for-profit company in the business of selling magazines and the
overwhelmingly non-transformative use militates towards finding a “4”.
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stantiality and at the same time coincides with the Court’s finding that this
factor weighed against fair use.224
Finally, the effect should be given a “4”. There was little doubt that
Harper & Row’s copyrighted work was significantly less valuable when
The Nation “scooped” it. In fact, Time Magazine refused to pay $12,000
for the story once the information was out.225 Thus, a grade of “4” is appropriate. The sum of these grades is 14, which confirms the Court’s finding of
infringement.226
CONCLUSION
A new approach to fair use is needed. Interpreting each of the four
factors is difficult enough, but adding a requirement that these four distinct
factors must be weighed together without any real objective basis makes it
extraordinarily difficult to reach a decision that is objectively analytical.
This lack of a real analytical process can easily give rise to accusations that
the results drive the copyright bus. Even if such a sinister motive is not
present, conceptualizing how different factors with different relative
strengths balance or weigh against each other is tantamount to tilting at
windmills. As seen, courts spend far more time interpreting the factors
rather than balancing them.
The proposed framework provides that analytical process and allows
triers of fact to make factual findings as to the relative intensity of each of
the factors and balance them in an objective, non-arbitrary manner. Allowing the framework to produce the final determination allows a full and
frank discussion of all four factors, including those that cut against the
victorious side, rather than minimizing those that inconveniently do not
favor the ultimate determination. Often, the framework will produce the
same result as the current method of analysis, but does so in an easy-tounderstand way that ensures the balancing takes place and all factors are
considered. In other cases, the framework might actually reach an opposite
conclusion, showing that the initial balancing of the four factors was either
done incorrectly or incompletely.
At the end of the day, the purpose behind this new framework is to
bring clarity to legal decision-making. Its purpose is not to offer a new,
wholesale shift in how fair use determinations are made. Rather, this
framework seems to complement current fair use analysis by providing an
objective basis from which to make decisions. Appellate courts would like224. Once again, a “2” could realistically be argued, since such a small amount was used relative to
the entire work.
225. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
226. 4+3+3+4=14.
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ly prefer such analysis as well, as it clearly illustrates how the lower court
made its decision. Litigants could then focus on particular factors from
which to appeal on and could limit their fight on one or two grounds that
might tip the scales in the opposite direction. All in all, using a clear, objective framework that logically produces a fair use determination benefits
both courts and litigants alike.

